

THE STRUCTURE OF MONETARY ASSETS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

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Abstract

Using a panel data set we investigate the specificities of the structure of monetary assets in transition economies. This analysis reveals the main factors standing behind the structure of deposits held with banks (demand or time deposits), as well as the determinants of the trade-off between cash and demand deposits in Central and Eastern European Countries and in Former Soviet Union countries. We show that the strong preference for cash, which appears in transition countries, is related to the extent of the informal sector. The relatively high share of time deposits compared to demand deposits is due to the inefficiency of the banking system and to the low level of development of alternative financial markets.

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
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1. Introduction

It is well established that transition countries have typically experienced a two-stage process of de-monetisation and re-monetisation in the course of the past 15 years (Berglof and Bolton (2002), Bonin and Wachtel (2002)). First, together with high inflation and the disruption of the production and exchange systems in the early 90s, the velocity of money increased significantly, as households and firms sought to keep the nominal assets in local currency to a minimum, and turned to value-keeping, mainly physical, means of preserving wealth¹. In a second stage, starting from mid-90s to post-1998 crisis with the success of macro-economic stabilisation policies and along with the implementation of financial reforms and the restructuring of the banking system, domestic liquid assets became more and more attractive, pushing upwards the ratio of broad money to GDP. Accordingly, transition countries appear to be on a convergence track towards developed economies, albeit at various degrees and still significantly backward (see chart below: average M2/GDP for CEECs, CIS and Euro area).



Source: Authors' calculation, based on the *Annual statistical bulletins* of the national central banks and the IFS (IMF). FSU countries: non-weighted average of Russia and Ukraine.

This widely accepted story however rests entirely on a broad money concept and does not give account of the composition of that aggregate. As a matter of fact, if there is a global convergence of the ratio of broad money (say M2) to output between transition and developed economies, that convergence disappears when splitting M2 into its components. For instance, the ratios to GDP of cash on the one hand and time deposits on the other hand, are both growing in the course of transition, whereas they show a declining trend in most developed economies². Beyond the usual debate about monetization, the questions we raise in this paper seek to analyse the reasons and potential persistence of such a divergence. Why do people in transition countries keep cash money in preference to demand deposits, more than it is the case in the developed world? Why do they hold larger time deposits (controlling for the income level)? Are these patterns going to persist in the long run, or are they mostly a residual and transitory phenomenon? What are the variables that would explain the monetary assets structure and their evolution in the context of transition?

¹ Of course, money in this conception would exclude the so-called “exotic” means of payment such as barter operations and payment arrears, as well as foreign currency cash or deposits.

² See **Appendix A**.

Going deeply into cash and various types of deposits in transition economies is an exercise, which has not been tried much so far. There are three lines of research which might deal with the questions we raise, namely (i) studies on the demand for money aimed at understanding inflation (or monitoring money supply), (ii) works on the estimation of the informal (“shadow”) economy using cash ratios, and (iii) studies on relationships between development and the financial sector, with applications to the banking reform of transition economies. The first line of research is rather classical and has been recently surveyed by Sriram (2001). Kruska (2003), in a study realised on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, shows that the main determinants of demand for cash are the real value of industry output, the nominal interest rate or the rate of inflation. More generally, inflation, interest and exchange rates remain everywhere, along with a transactions index, the basic ingredients of the money demand function. However, little is said about the structure of that demand; one exception, but rather ancient, is Barro and Santomero (1972). The authors distinguish three means of holding liquid assets: cash, demand deposits and savings deposits; they show that the demand for money is inversely related to the differential interest return between savings and demand deposits. Another conclusion of their study is that demand for cash is insensitive to the interest rate on alternative liquid assets but is inversely dependent on the rate on demand deposits. And, finally, the ratio of currency to total money holdings is “independent” of income.

The direction of the shadow economy has been surveyed by Schneider and Ernste (1998) and refers to the well-known methods developed by Feige (1979) and Guttmann (1977). Feige’s transaction approach consists in assuming that there is a constant relation over time between the volume of transactions and the GNP. The GNP in the shadow economy can be calculated by subtracting the official GNP from total nominal GNP. Guttmann’s currency demand method is one of the most commonly used approaches. It assumes that the shadow (or hidden) transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave no observable traces for the authorities.. It has been adapted to the treatment of transition countries by Hanousek and Palda (2003, 2004), who show that the currency demand methods are useless for the transition economies because of intensive financial innovation during transition. Financial innovation can destabilize money demand as these forces interfere with the motives of holding cash. The preference for cash may not be entirely due to tax-fraud (or regulation-by-passes), but more simply to the inefficiency of certain financial services and the underdevelopment of the banking system.

This, in turn, leads to banking reforms, the third research topic which might be pertinent for the analysis of the structure of monetary assets. There is a huge set of works on the relations between financial development and economic growth; empirical works go in both directions: Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) show that the relation is positive, but Loayza and Ranciere (2002) show the opposite in the case of Latin America. In the case of transition economies, Neimke (2003) shows convincingly that there is a significant impact of financial development on economic growth. This however does not help us with the structure of money demand, since financial development is often measured by a ratio of broad money to GDP. More specific studies of the banking sector reforms in transition economies like in Staerh (2003) or Meyendorff and Thakor (2002) focus on problems of competition, concentration, legal environment and banking supervision, but do not link these industry structures and banks behaviour to the performance of the system in terms of the forms taken by money held by non-bank agents; for instance, nothing is said about the impact of the lack of competition between banks on the preference of households and firms to detain cash instead of deposits.

To sum up, the question of the specificities of the structure of money demand in transition countries, although not treated directly in the literature, might draw insights from

the three lines of research mentioned above: first, it is clear that “classical” variables such as interest and / or inflation rates may have an influence on choosing the form under which liquid assets should be held: non- (or little-) remunerated demand deposits, or often highly remunerated time deposits. Second, it is also probable that fiscal, social or regulatory evasions play a role in the choice between cash and any kind of deposit. Third, banking sector efficiency, for instance the existence (or not) of modern means of payments, credit facilities and other factors making the quality of a banking system, which all depend on the degree of competition between banks, also play a role in the holding deposits with these institutions.

The main contribution of the present paper is empirical. It consists in using the panel data approach to explain the structure of money assets in the transition economies’ case, taking the Euro zone as a “benchmark”. As far as we know this topic has not been dealt with so far. The vast majority of studies on money demand use the Johansen co-integration method and the vector error correction models; these are time series analyses, and they are applied to many transition economies, however on a case-by-case basis³. The methodology we apply proceeds with many countries together, also with a chronological dimension.

Section 2 deals with a descriptive outlook (including a presentation of the data base), together with a brief history, of financial systems in transition countries. Section 3 raises the question of the structure of deposits – demand or time deposits – held with banks; it proposes to explain the share of time deposits in total deposits using a function of demand for money, and tests whether transition countries behave the same way developed countries do in this respect. Section 4 deals with the question of the distribution of M1 between cash and demand deposits: both assets do not yield any interest and the cost of holding them – inflation – is the same; in that case, shadow economy plus banking efficiency are proposed as the main variables influencing the choice. Section 5 concludes.

2. Financial systems in transition countries

Are financial systems specific in transition countries, and in what way? Transition is usually defined a long term process by which, according to the EBRD:

- Enterprises are being privatized, their governance is improved and hard budget constraint is imposed.
- Markets are liberalized, both internal and foreign, together with the setting up of the necessary regulation agencies.
- Financial markets are liberalized, both with the banking system and with securities markets.
- Infrastructures are reformed.

It is on the basis of these orientations that the EBRD calculates the so-called “reform indicators” which are attributed to each transition country. Summing (arithmetically) the nine corresponding indicators leads to a spectrum of 9 (minimal note) to 40,5 (maximum) ; the least advanced country (Turkmenistan) hardly reaches 12 in 2004; Belarus, another well known laggard, has 17,5. That transition is really a long term process is shown by the fact that, after 14 years of transition, the most advanced countries – Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary – have not yet reached the maximal note, which is defined as “standards typical of advanced industrial economies”⁴.

Now, what is the role of transition in this institutional backwardness, and what is the role of underdevelopment (the GDP per capita of the most advanced transition countries remains

³ See Van Aarle and Budina (1995), Cuthbertson and Bredin (2001), Kruska (2003).

⁴ Poland is at 34, Czech Republic and Hungary are at 35. Slovenia is far behind at 31,5. Figures drawn from Transition Report 2004, p6; the methodology of calculation of the 9 reform indicators is on pages 199-200.

at half the level of high income countries). Would the notes of the bulk of emerging *market* economies be very different from the ones of emerging *transition* economies? Judging from the listing of the quite famous “Washington consensus”, a document which was established by John Williamson before the fall of the Berlin wall and was targeted to pinpoint the necessary reforms in the developing world (particularly Latin America), the reform agenda of developing market economies looked very similar to the one which would be set up a few months later for transition countries⁵.

There is however a matter of degree in these reforms. The Washington consensus has among its ten proposed “reforms” a line called “financial liberalization”; on the EBRD’s list of reform indicators, this line is also present, even if it is sub-divided into the two main compartments of the financial sector, banks and securities markets. But J. Williamson’s financial liberalization is aimed at establishing market-determined interest rates, and two measures on which he insists is on the scheduling (premature opening of the capital account with banks not robust enough to intermediate capital inflows efficiently has proved disastrous for certain countries) and on reinforcing prudential supervision. In contrast, financial reform in transition countries starts from scratch, everything has to be build.

Before transition, the banking system of communist countries was organized under the form of a ‘mono-bank’. The ‘mono-bank’ took deposits from households but decisions on the distribution of credit belonged to the central planning office. Credit was underwritten by the state, and bank officials had no incentive to stop or develop credit. Credit was available nearly for free, so that there was practically no time constraint on performances of firms. The mono-bank created as much credit as was required without being constrained by the opportunity cost of funds or the need to evaluate lending risk. Consequently, the flow of funds involving households, the mono-bank, planning agencies and industrial firms led to the gradual increase of bad and unserviceable loans. As a result, inflation pressure increased, first under the form of shortages, later in an open form.

With transition, the financial sector reform in CEECs and the CIS began by the separation of the banking sector into two tiers: central and commercial banks. The aim was to separate the sovereign functions of monetary policy and banking supervision on the one side, from the commercial activity of lending and deposits transformation on the other side. Commercial banks remained however mainly state-owned at that initial stage, and the practice of directed credits and control on interest rates persisted extensively. Thus banking systems were confronted with much of the same old problems: bad loans, low savings and investment levels, illiquid securities markets that provides little capital. Although each transition country chose its own approach in progressing with the reforms of the financial sector, many countries gradually cut or reduced subsidies to enterprises, making them more reliant on non-state financial sources. For instance, in Romania and the Czech Republic, the outside financing became more important after the beginning of the financial sector reform.

The key issues relating to bank restructuring in the second stage of transition include the following actions: solving the banks’ bad loans issue and limiting instruments of “soft budget constraint”; developing financial markets for equities and other securities; and building institutions aimed at the supervision of banks and regulation of financial markets. Starting from a relatively low rate of savings, transition economies have both to enhance an

⁵ Up to the point that many specialists believe that the Washington Consensus is something that has been devised primarily for transition countries (it is then presented in a caricatural way with the triad “liberalization / stabilization / privatization”) and is often associated with the so-called “shock therapy”. See John Williamson, “A short History of the Washington Consensus”, Paper commissioned by Foundation CIDOB for the Conference “From the Washington Consensus towards a New Global Governance”, Barcelona, September 24-25, 2004. And John Williamson, “The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development”, a lecture in the series “Practitioners of Development” delivered at the World Bank on January 13, 2004.


efficient transformation of domestic savings into long-term investments order, and attracting as much foreign capital as possible. Whereas capital flows and foreign direct investments play a crucial role in the development of transition countries, higher and sustained growth rate will be obtained in the long run through a build-up of domestic savings.

In order to realise this scenario, the banking sector has to be restructured and it has to be independent from the political regime. This means privatisation of banks, enhancing competition and plugging the financial system to international financial markets. In the course of implementing this programme, the bulk of transition countries have encountered one or several crises (of various degrees of severity) during the 90's. Several factors have triggered these financial crises in the transition economies:

- in certain cases, after the East Asian crisis of 1997, international investors who had previously transferred large amounts of short term capital to transition economies withdrew these investments and, by a movement which has been coined as “flight to quality”, moved them to developed countries financial markets. Consequently, several transition countries have been touched by some external idiosyncratic shocks (cases of Russia and Ukraine in 1998). In that case, there is a similarity with the crisis of non-transition emerging economies.

- in other cases however, the crisis was the effect of transition itself: several commercial banks were created on the basis of old state-owned banks. They inherited large portfolios of credits to state-owned enterprises, which permanently rolled over their debts. The transition process, by which subsidies were gradually removed and internal and external competition rose, drastically reduced the firms profitability. The roll-over of credits became clearly non-sustainable, which triggered a crisis both in the industrial and in the banking sectors (cases of Bulgaria in 1996 and the Czech Republic in 1997).

Despite major progresses in the reform of banking sectors in these economies, including the privatization of many state-owned banks, the entry of successful *de novo* competitors and the development of regulatory and supervisory capabilities, there was little financial deepening, as reflected in the level of monetization which remained at a low level. Graph 1 above showed that the ratio of M2 to GDP remained at approximately half of the Euro area average, and the situation is similar for M1. In 2003, the ratio of M1 to GDP was 16,4 percent in Russia, 19,3 percent in Hungary and 33,6 percent in the Czech Republic (the most advanced transition country from that point of view), compared to 37,5 percent as an average for the euro area, as can be seen in the graph below.



Source: Authors' calculation, based on the *Annual statistical bulletins* of the national central banks and the IFS (IMF). FSU: see graph 1

This choppy evolution of overall monetization in transition economies came together with a specific structuring of money balances. The weakness of the banking sector and financial markets led economic agents to behave in a particular way when decisions about which assets, cash, demand deposits or time deposits, should be held. We focus in this paper

not on the global degree of monetization of the economies but rather on its structure. Our topic is the structure of monetary assets (cash and various deposits held with banks).

The data set we are using in this analysis is built as a panel of yearly country observations drawn from the *Annual statistical bulletins* of the National Central Banks, the European Central Bank' *Blue Book*, the World Bank' *World Development Indicators*, the IMF *International Financial Statistics*, the EBRD *Transition Reports* ⁶ and includes 13 countries ⁷ over the period 1993-2004. In this respect, the table below shows a descriptive and summary outlook of the situation of the countries under review (averages for the two categories of transition countries are non weighted averages; the line 'euro area' is not an average but the data for the whole area). The first part of the table shows the structure of liquid assets (share of cash in M1) and the second part of the table shows the structure of deposits (share of demand deposits in total deposits):

Table A.

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
M0/M1											
CEEC	0,38	0,38	0,39	0,37	0,37	0,39	0,40	0,39	0,38	0,36	0,34
FSU	n.a.	n.a.	0,55	0,59	0,57	0,63	0,60	0,56	0,58	0,59	0,58
euro area	0,22	0,22	0,21	0,20	0,20	0,18	0,18	0,17	0,11	0,14	0,15
Demand deposits to total deposits ratio											
CEEC	0,44	0,41	0,38	0,39	0,38	0,34	0,33	0,32	0,32	0,35	0,38
FSU	n.a.	n.a.	0,42	0,40	0,48	0,36	0,36	0,41	0,39	0,36	0,34
euro area	0,24	0,25	0,33	0,35	0,38	0,39	0,42	0,43	0,45	0,45	0,47

Source: Authors' calculations, based on the *Annual statistical bulletins* of the national central banks and the IFS (IMF).

As can be seen, over the period, the euro area countries reduced by almost a third the share of cash in M1. The larger decrease is taking place in 2001 when cash Euros were introduced⁸. As the banking system has done the major part of the conversion, some of the cash came on the deposits. The evolution of this ratio is rather stable in the CEECs and in the FSU countries, but at a much bigger scale. The share of demand deposits in total deposits has slowly reduced in the CEECs and in the FSU countries, but we observe an inverse evolution of this ratio in the euro area. This implied that the households and enterprises put progressively their savings in banks instead of keeping them in demand deposits. The little development of the stock market in transition countries suggests that there is no major alternative investment. The euro zone is presented in order to have a benchmark and a comparative trend. In the euro zone cash is still on very low and decreasing trend, time deposits are decreasing due to alternative more profitable investment, as for example in stock markets.

In order to explain the share of various kinds of money balances, we start from the demand for money model:

$$M_{i,t} = P_{i,t} * L(Y_t, R_{i,t}) \quad (1),$$

where $M_{i,t}$ –the nominal money balances; $P_{i,t}$ – an index of the price level; $Y_{i,t}$ - the real income; $R_{i,t}$ -the short-run nominal interest rate (% per annum). We adopt the Fischer

⁶ See **Appendix B** for a more precise description of the data set (both on the way indicators were built and on data sources).

⁷ The analysis is realized over 10 CEECs (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia), 2 FSU countries (Russia and Ukraine) and the euro-zone (as an average for the 15 countries).

⁸ See Willem F. Duisenberg (2002).

hypothesis according to which the nominal interest rate, $R_{i,t}$, consists of real interest rate and compensation for expected inflation, so that there is no need to consider the rate of inflation $\pi_{i,t}$ as a specific factor of demand for real cash balances.

If we split money in different components we will have the following demand functions:

$$M_{a,t} = P_t^* L_a(Y_t, R_{a,t}) \quad (2),$$

$$M_{b,t} = P_t^* L_b(Y_t, R_{b,t}) \quad (3),$$

where $M_{a,t}, M_{b,t}$ – the demand for the assets a or b; $P_{i,t}$ – an index of the price level; $Y_{i,t}$ – the real income; $R_{a,t}$ and $R_{b,t}$ – the opportunity cost of holding the assets a or b versus another alternative assets.

The ratio of these assets will be:

$$\frac{M_{a,t}}{M_{b,t}} = \frac{P_t^* L_a(Y_t, R_{a,t})}{P_t^* L_b(Y_t, R_{b,t})} = \frac{Y_t^{\alpha_1} * R_{a,t}^{\alpha_2} * \theta_t^{\omega_1}}{Y_t^{\beta_1} * R_{b,t}^{\beta_2} * \theta_t^{\omega_2}} = Y_t^{(\alpha_1 - \beta_1)} * R_{a,t}^{\alpha_2} * R_{b,t}^{(-\beta_2)} * \theta_t^{(\omega_1 - \omega_2)} \quad (4),$$

where θ_t represent other factors influencing the demand of assets a or b.

The linear form of the equation (4) is:

$$\ln \frac{M_{a,t}}{M_{b,t}} = (\alpha_1 - \beta_1) \ln Y_t + \alpha_2 \ln R_{a,t} + (-\beta_2) \ln R_{b,t} + (\omega_1 - \omega_2) \ln \theta_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (5),$$

where ε_t – the error term.

We can write the equation (5) in a more simple way:

$$\ln \frac{M_{a,t}}{M_{b,t}} = \gamma_1 \ln Y_t + \gamma_2 \ln R_{a,t} + \gamma_3 \ln R_{b,t} + \gamma_4 \Pi_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (6),$$

where Π_t – other factors influencing the demand for assets a or b.

In the present study we analyze the determinants of the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits in the national currency and of the ratio of cash to M1 in national currency. The two ratios will take the form of the equation (6).

In the case of demand deposits to total deposits ratio:

$$\ln \frac{M_{1,t} - M_{0,t}}{M_{2,t} - M_{0,t}} = \gamma_1 \ln Y_t + \gamma_2 \ln R_{1,t} + \gamma_3 \ln R_{2,t} + \gamma_4 \Pi_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (7),$$

where $R_{1,t}$ – the opportunity cost of detaining the asset M1 versus an alternative benchmark asset; $R_{2,t}$ – the opportunity cost of holding the asset M2; Π_t – refers to some other variables which may influence the ratio of demand to total deposits (the differential of interest between time and demand deposits, the volatility of stock exchange prices, the development of the financial market). We expect a negative value for the coefficient of the interest rate and a non-significant value for the coefficient of the inflation rate.

For the cash to M1 (in national currency) ratio:

$$\ln \frac{M_{0,t}}{M_{1,t}} = \gamma_1 \ln Y_t + \gamma_2 \ln R_{0,t} + \gamma_3 \ln R_{1,t} + \gamma_4 \Pi_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (8)$$

where $R_{0,t}$ the opportunity cost of detaining cash; $R_{1,t}$ the opportunity cost of holding the asset M1; Π_t refers to other variables influencing the trade-off between cash and demand deposits, such as the informal economy, the efficiency of the banking sector (test in table 1.3). The expectations are of a negative value for the coefficient of the GDP per capita (γ_1). The banking intermediation is increasing with the income level. In principle the interest rate and the inflation rate should not affect this ratio (γ_2 and γ_3 are expected to be non-significant).

There is no return for the cash in circulation and, in general the return for demand deposits, when it exists, is quite small.

The measure of income is the real GDP per capita. The nominal interest rate is the opportunity cost of holding money; we use the deposit rate. Additionally, we take into account the rate of inflation (CPI, annual)⁹. The results of the estimations are presented in the Sections 3 and 4.

3. The structure of deposits held with banks: why do people choose the demand deposits or the time deposits?

Table 1. The ratio of demand deposits to total deposits (in national currency)

Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS
GDP per capita	-0.177 (2.50)**	-0.094 (1.41)	-0.109 (2.35)**	-0.233 (4.57)***	-0.115 (2.30)**	-0.052 (0.74)
Interest rate on time deposits	-0.121 (3.17)***			-0.155 (4.36)***		
Dummy euro area	0.295 (2.41)**	0.328 (2.85)***	0.531 (5.27)***	0.512 (5.52)***	0.524 (4.95)***	0.273 (2.39)**
Inflation		-0.010 (0.34)				
Government bonds Yield ^a			-0.024 (0.70)	-0.055 (1.42)		
Market capitalization (% GDP)						0.017 (0.63)
Interest differential ^{a,aa}					0.025 (1.19)	
Constant	0.687 (1.10)	-0.259 (0.44)	-0.287 (0.77)	1.156 (2.53)**	-0.349 (0.94)	-0.703 (1.26)
Hausman test ^b (p-value)	0.6517	0.6745	0.8687	0.9110	0.4104	0.4287
Breusch- Pagan LM test ^c (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Wooldridge test ^d (p-value)	0.0211	0.0172	0.1942	0.1944	0.0881	0.0224
Wald test ^e (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
LR test ^f (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	133	134	93	93	93	121
Number of groups	13	13	12	12	12	13

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a data missing in the case of Hungary.

^{aa} the difference between the interest paid on government bonds and the interest paid on long-term deposits.

^b the null hypothesis is that of the absence of fixed effects.

^c the null hypothesis is that of no random effects (var[u]=0).

^d the null hypothesis is that of no first-order autocorrelation.

^e the null hypothesis is that of groupwise homoskedasticity ($\sigma_i^2 = \sigma^2$ for all i)

^f the null hypothesis is that of homoskedasticity.

We use the Feasible General Least Square (FGLS) method for the estimation of the equations. The Hausman test indicates the appropriateness' use of random effects. There is serial correlation in our panel data (in the regressions (1), (2) and (6)), as the Wooldridge test

⁹ Data are obtained from statistical bulletins of central banks of the analyzed economies.

show. The heteroskedasticity tests (both the modified Wald test for the groupwise homoskedasticity and the LR test) show its presence in all the estimations.

As one can see:

- the real GDP per capita is negative and significant (exception - the regressions (2) and (6)). Usually a high GDP corresponds to a developed financial and banking system. As a consequence, a larger use of the banking and of financial market's product and services may explain the negative sign of the coefficient.
- analyzing the signs of the coefficients of interest rate and inflation rate show us that they are consistent with theoretical postulates. Taking into account the nominal deposit rate¹⁰, one can expect that its growth should encourage saving money on bank accounts that is getting rid of the most liquid monetary measure. Negative signs of coefficients of $R_{i,t}$ support entirely this conclusion. The increase of $R_{i,t}$ by 1 percent should not decrease the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits by more than 0.155 percent. The second testes measure of an opportunity cost of holding money is the rate of inflation. It should be noticed that the relationship containing both $R_{i,t}$ and $\pi_{i,t}$ was not estimated. The inflation doesn't affect the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits.

We use of the Euro area as a "benchmark" by the mean of a dummy variable. The coefficients of this variable are positive and significant in all the regressions, confirming the data presented in the **table A**; the use of demand deposits is larger in the Euro area countries.

There are some other determinants of the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits in national currency. First, we wonder whether demand deposits provide an adequate return. The existence of an interest rate on demand deposits will definitely influence the choice between the two categories of deposits. We couldn't introduce it in our estimations because of the data unavailability for Romania, Ukraine and the Euro area. We take into account the interest provide for the government bonds as alternative assets. This should affect negatively the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits; the higher the yield on government bonds, the smaller the incentive of detaining demand deposits. But the results of our estimations are non-significant. We equally test the possible influence on the analyzed ratio of an interest differential; this is determined as a difference between the interest paid on government bonds and the interest paid on long-term deposits. This interest differential can be a factor explaining the trade-off. Normally, the larger is the differential, the smaller is the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits. But the intuitions are not confirmed by the estimations.

Second, does the development of the financial market influence the agents' choice between demand and time deposits? In order to answer that question, we propose to use an indicator that captures the financial market development. This is the market capitalization of listed companies (as a % of GDP); normally, a developed financial market offers a large sample of services so that the use of demand deposits is reduced. The results of the estimations are not significant. And, last not least, we wonder whether credit transfers that are "feeding" the current account influence one way or another the trade-off between demand and time deposits. This question will be treated in a future version of our study.

4. The distribution of M1 between cash and demand deposits in national currency

In the pre-transition period, the banking sector was made up by a handful of state-owned savings and loans type banks. Due to lack of competition, the scope of banking


¹⁰ Deposit rate is the rate offered to resident customers for demand, time, or saving deposits (IFS (IMF) definition).

services was very limited. Following transition foreign banks have entered financial markets and introduced competition. Competition narrows the gap between the level of financial services provided in transition and developed economies. Some products, such as cheques were never introduced in transition countries, as they were already outdated and superceded by credit and debit cards.

In transition countries money demand can change for the following reasons:

- a) a lack of credit is a feature of early transition economies and forces people to hold cash. As credit widens, cash balances fall. Bank failures during transition can force agents to change their cash-holding strategies towards holding increasing amounts of cash. At the same time, transition economies experience great ups and downs in taxes. These taxes will in turn move people to transact in cash to avoid their obligations to government.
- b) At certain periods, the real interest rate was negative in several transition economies. Does a negative real interest rate stimulate people out of demand deposits and into cash holdings? The answer is clearly negative, since holding cash gives a zero nominal return which is anyway inferior to the positive – although low – nominal return given by deposits.
- c) Changes in bank regulation determine changes in the currency to demand deposits in ways that are hard to measure. Many transition countries changed their regulations quite frequently.
- d) Banking crises occurred in almost all transition countries in the 1990s. The loss and return of depositor confidence was bound to at first raise, and then depress the currency to demand deposits ratio in ways that are hard to measure.

To get a feeling for the volatility of currency to demand deposits consider the figure below:



Source: Authors' calculation, based on the *Annual statistical bulletins* of the national central banks and the IFS(FMI).

The pattern of currency to demand deposits ratios is diverse in the analyzed countries. In the CEECs the average ratio is volatile, starting from 82,7 percent in 1993 and reaching 61,4 percent in 2003. The ratio is significantly volatile in the FSU countries, reaching the higher level at the outset of the banking crisis (177,7 percent). The countries of the euro area experienced a decline in the ratio, from 34,9 percent in 1993 to 8 percent in 2003. The volatility in the currency to demand deposit ratio, in the transition economies, is explained by shocks in monetary and financial sector.

We estimate the determinants of the ratio M0 over M1 (**table 2**). When GDP per capita is high, cash is less used than demand deposits. As for the equation (7) - (11) a higher income per capita increases the savings opportunities. Usually a high GDP corresponds to a developed financial and banking system, and, as a consequence, to a larger use of the banking system's product and services. Therefore, the use of cash is reduced. The interest rate and the inflation rate present negative and significant coefficients; the bigger the interest paid on time deposits, the smaller the incentive of holding cash money. Similarly, the high inflation illustrates an instable macroeconomic climate and this explains the reduced holdings of cash. If we introduce the informal sector, we find a positive and significant effect of this variable on the analyzed ratio (see equations (9) and (10)). This means that the bigger the informal sector in the economy, the larger is the use of cash compared to demand deposits. Not surprisingly cash is much more used in the informal sector, in order to avoid taxes and state controls in such activities. The dummy variable for the Euro area is not significant in none of the regressions.

Table 2. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency)

Regressors	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS
GDP per capita	-0.232 (7.77)***	-0.241 (8.42)***	-0.242 (9.39)***	-0.251 (9.82)***	-0.315 (10.12)***
Interest rate on time deposits	-0.044 (3.71)***		-0.044 (3.49)***		
Dummy euro area	-0.067 (0.30)	-0.019 (0.09)	0.019 (0.12)	0.055 (0.34)	0.163 (1.08)
Inflation		-0.026 (4.01)***		-0.028 (3.75)***	
Informal sector			0.040 (2.08)**	0.035 (1.85)*	0.032 (1.24)
Government bonds Yield ^a					-0.025 (1.47)
Constant	1.294 (5.21)***	1.327 (5.68)***	1.230 (5.02)***	1.287 (5.35)***	1.799 (6.18)***
Hausman test ^b (p-value)	0.2432	0.1210	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Breusch- Pagan LM test ^c (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000			
Wooldridge test ^d (p-value)	0.0032	0.0030	0.0029	0.0028	0.0003
Wald test ^e (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
LR test ^f (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	136	137	136	137	94
Number of groups	13	13	13	13	12

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a data missing in the case of Hungary.

^b the null hypothesis is that of the absence of fixed effects.

^c the null hypothesis is that of no random effects (var[u]=0).

^d the null hypothesis is that of no first-order autocorrelation.

^e the null hypothesis is that of groupwise homoskedasticity ($\sigma_i^2 = \sigma^2$ for all i)

^f the null hypothesis is that of homoskedasticity.

We introduce some indicators illustrating the efficiency of the banking system, such as the EBRD index of banking reform (regression (12)) and the interest rate spread (regressions (13) and (14)). We have the following results (see **table 3**): the well-implemented reform, illustrated by a high EBRD index of banking reform, is associated to a small ratio of cash to M1 in national currency (see regression (12)). The people's confidence in the banking system is higher and, consequently, they rely more on the banking system. For the interest rate spread

the expectations are that the bigger is this spread, the bigger is the use of cash. A high interest rate spread is the synonym of an inefficient banking system and this explains the reduced use of the banking services and products (see also, Duchêne, Jimborean and Najman (2005)). But the estimations show a non-significant coefficient for this variable.

If we introduce the indicator of dollarisation¹¹ (see regressions (15) and (16)), we have the results presented in **table 3**. In transition countries, most studies use the ratio of foreign currency deposits to M2 as a proxy of the level of currency substitution or dollarisation. This measure does not seem adequate however, because it omits the foreign currency cash in circulation, which flaws the extent of dollarisation. Some studies use the ratio of foreign currency deposits to the monetary aggregate M2D (which is the sum of M1 and of time deposits in local currency)¹² (Sarajevs (2000), IMF studies). We consider this measure as inappropriate as the previous one. In total, we prefer to use a measure of dollarisation, which relates foreign currency deposits to total deposits (Mongardini and Mueller (1999)).

Table 3. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency)

Regressors	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS
GDP per capita	-0.171 (5.28)***	-0.245 (8.29)***	-0.220 (7.08)***	-0.087 (3.39)***	-0.065 (2.04)**
EBRD banking Reform index ^a	-0.070 (2.87)***				
Inflation		-0.027 (3.83)***			
Interest rate Spread		0.004 (0.30)	0.004 (0.25)		
Dummy euro area		-0.011 (0.05)	-0.030 (0.14)	-0.581 (2.85)***	-0.613 (2.88)***
Dollarisation				0.408 (12.51)***	0.438 (12.96)***
Interest rate on time deposits					0.014 (0.80)
Constant	0.906 (3.88)***	1.352 (5.41)***	1.093 (4.16)***	0.554 (2.82)***	0.367 (1.37)
Hausman test ^b (p-value)	0.0671	0.0001	0.1210	0.2010	0.0234
Breusch- Pagan LM test ^c (p-value)	0.0000		0.0000	0.0000	
Wooldridge test ^d (p- value)	0.0075	0.0034	0.0033	0.0052	0.0054
Wald test ^e (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
LR test ^f (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	130	136	136	135	134
Number of groups	12	13	13	13	13

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a data missing in the case of the euro area.

^b the null hypothesis is that of the absence of fixed effects.

^c the null hypothesis is that of no random effects (var[u]=0).

^d the null hypothesis is that of no first-order autocorrelation.

^e the null hypothesis is that of groupwise homoskedasticity ($\sigma_i^2 = \sigma^2$ for all i)

^f the null hypothesis is that of homoskedasticity.

¹¹ We use as a proxy for the dollarisation the ratio of foreign currency deposits to the total of deposits (both in foreign and national currency).

¹² M1 is the sum of cash and demand deposits in local currency, so that the M2D appears as a measure of the domestic supply of money.

The coefficient of the dollarisation ratio is significant and positive. This means that the larger is the currency substitution, the higher is the ratio of cash to M1 in national currency. What can be the explanations? As stated in the literature, the massive currency substitution was due to hyper- inflation episodes during the transition process in some Central and Eastern European Countries. Keeping deposits in dollars is often used as a way to seek a protection against inflation and exchange rate depreciation risks. Interest rate is not significant as soon as it remains very low for demand deposits, and is not sufficiently attractive, in comparison with other factors, to stimulate the transformation of cash into bank deposits. So, the deeper is the monetary instability (which appears in high dollarisation ratios), the larger is the use of cash. The dummy for the Euro area is negative and significant only in the regressions (15) and (16); this confirms the well-known fact that cash is less used in the Euro area countries, where there are a lot of alternative ways of placements.

There are some other indicators that can be used in order to reflect the efficiency of the banking system. These are related to the use of payment instruments, such as credit and debit cards, credit transfers and direct debits, ATM's network and POS terminals. In an economy where there is a large use of these instruments there is a smaller need of money to finance the business activities compared to an economy where all the payments are realized in cash. A future version of our study will consider the use of the cashless payment instruments in transition economies.

We have to consider the possible presence of endogeneity, usually induced by omitted variables, measurement errors and simultaneity. In its presence the FGLS procedure produce inconsistent estimators. We will therefore apply two econometric procedures: a panel instrumental variables estimator via the generalized method-of-moments (GMM) and a panel instrumental variable/two-stage least squares estimator (IV/2SLS). In both cases the "instrumented" variable is the per capita real GDP. Instruments' choice is very controversial; thus, we will proceed by adding them step-by-step. First, we have the "simple set" consisting of the initial per capita GDP and the initial level of educational attainment; than, we add the macroeconomic stability indicators (the government size and the openness to international trade) and we call this the "policy set". At least but not at last, we have the "full set"; it consists of the "policy set" and several measures of political stability: number of revolutions and coups, number of assassination per thousand inhabitants, etc. The Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions gives us the answer related to the validity of instruments.

The results are presented in the tables that follow. We present only the case of the simple set of instruments; all the other cases are presented in the **Appendix C**.

Table 1.1. The ratio of demand deposits to total deposits (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(1.1)	(2.1)	(3.1)	(4.1)	(5.1)	(6.1.)
	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM
GDP per capita	-0.537 (6.16)***	-0.557 (5.52)***	-0.589 (5.85)***	-0.580 (6.38)***	-0.565 (4.54)***	-0.724 (5.94)***
Interest rate	-0.272 (4.64)***			-0.270 (3.54)***		
On time deposits						
Dummy euro area	0.831 (6.36)***	0.982 (6.36)***	1.066 (6.64)***	0.901 (6.36)***	1.196 (5.64)***	0.942 (5.82)***
Inflation		-0.186 (3.23)***				
Government bonds			-0.306	-0.083		
Yield ¹			(3.57)***	(0.89)		
Market						0.205
Capitalization (%GDP)						(3.30)***
Interest					0.041	

Differential ^{1,aa}					(0.44)	
Constant	3.840 (4.85)***	3.863 (4.20)***	4.317 (4.76)***	4.316 (5.26)***	3.302 (3.32)***	4.361 (4.66)***
Anderson test (p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.2583	0.3923	0.0998	0.1025	0.2256	0.6880
Observations	133	134	93	93	93	121
R ²	0.8692	0.8429	0.8463	0.8618	0.8004	0.8422

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

¹ data missing in the case of Hungary.

^{aa} the difference between the interest paid on government bonds and the interest paid on long-term deposits

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.

^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(1-6.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(1-6.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(1-6.3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

The Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test shows that the equation is identified in all the regressions. The Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are valid. The IV/2SLS method produces the same results as in the case of the FGLS method: the real GDP per capita has a negative and significant coefficient, the real interest rate and the inflation rate— a negative and significant coefficient, the Euro area dummy is positive and significant. For the 3rd regression, the interest on government bonds presents, this time, the expected negative and significant coefficient.

Table 2.1. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(7.1) GMM	(8.1) GMM	(9.1) GMM	(10.1) GMM	(11.1) GMM	(12.1) GMM
GDP per capita	-0.439 (7.34)***	-0.466 (7.18)***	-0.316 (4.78)***	-0.322 (4.68)***	-0.322 (4.64)***	-0.503 (4.58)***
Interest rate	-0.054 (1.49)		-0.040 (1.25)			
On time deposits						
Dummy euro area	0.229 (1.84)*	0.238 (1.88)*	0.388 (3.07)***	0.401 (3.26)***	0.410 (3.22)***	
Inflation		-0.085 (2.41)**		-0.074 (2.51)**		
Informal sector			0.182 (3.34)***	0.203 (3.67)***	0.162 (2.76)***	
EBRD banking						0.135 (1.19)
Reform index ¹						
Constant	2.981 (5.54)***	3.307 (5.60)***	1.332 (1.89)*	1.408 (1.93)*	1.351 (1.88)*	2.980 (5.08)***
Anderson test(p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.2571	0.0662	0.7376	0.3545	0.6118	0.1830
Observations	136	137	136	137	137	130
R ²	0.8663	0.8643	0.8963	0.8995	0.8928	0.8379

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

¹ data missing in the case of the euro area.

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.

^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(7-12.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(7-12.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(7-12.3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

In the case of the cash/M1 ratio, the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test shows that the equation is identified in all the regressions. The Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are valid. The IV/2SLS method produces the same results as in the case of the FGLS method: the real GDP per capita has a negative and significant coefficient, the inflation – a negative and significant coefficient. The coefficient of the interest on time deposits is non-significant, while the Euro area dummy presents a positive and significant. The informal sector variable presents the expected positive and significant coefficient.

Table 3.1.. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(13.1) GMM	(14.1) GMM	(15.1) GMM	(16.1) GMM
GDP per capita	-0.432 (5.41)***	-0.452 (4.81)***	-0.239 (5.92)***	-0.204 (3.67)***
Inflation	-0.099 (3.34)***			
Dollarisation			0.421 (9.74)***	0.422 (9.18)***
Interest rate Spread	0.062 (0.99)	-0.038 (0.50)		0.048 (1.10)
Dummy euro area	0.200 (1.51)	0.295 (1.92)*	-0.276 (2.38)**	-0.303 (2.53)**
Constant	2.919 (3.72)***	3.058 (3.33)***	1.695 (5.46)***	1.300 (2.44)**
Anderson test(p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.0911	0.2884	0.0074	0.0077
Observations	136	136	135	134
R ²	0.8738	0.8628	0.9456	0.9455

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.

^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(13-16.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(13-16.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(13-16..3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

Once again, the equation is identified in all the regressions as the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test shows. The Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are valid in the regressions (13) and (14), while their validity is called into question when considering the dollarisation ratio (regressions (15) and (16)). The IV/2SLS method produces the same results as in the case of the FGLS method: the real GDP per capita has a negative and significant coefficient, the inflation – a negative and significant coefficient. The coefficient of the interest rate spread is non-significant, while the Euro area dummy presents a positive and significant (regression (14)) and the expected negative coefficient in the last two regressions ((15) and (16)). The informal sector variable presents the expected positive and significant coefficient.

The same results are obtained via the GMM instrumental procedure (ivgmm0).

If we look at the results obtained in all the cases (**Appendix C**), there are situations when there is doubt on the validity of the instruments. As mentioned above, the choice of instruments is very controversial; in a future version of the paper we will seek to clarify this aspect by the mean of more complex econometrical tests and procedures.

5. Conclusions

Why do people in transition countries keep cash money in preference to demand deposits more than it is the case in the developed world? This was the starting point in our analysis.

As far as the tests and the statistical data show, cash is more preferred in the FSU countries than in the CEECs. The large informal sector is the main explanation for the high ratio of cash to M1 in all transition countries.

Demand deposits are not the predominant form of deposits in neither of these countries. Why do people prefer time deposits? The high interest rate paid by the banks can explain this form of detaining money. Another possible explanation is the lack of alternative ways of investment placements, the financial markets being little developed and in an incipient stage in these countries.

Can we speak of an inefficiency of the banking system in transition countries? It is rather an under-development, which is due to a “more recent” banking reform. We assist in these economies at the creation of the two-tiers system only at the end of the 80s; at this time, the developed economies have already had in place well regulated and wealthy banking and financial systems. These specificities of the banking systems in transition can be an explanation of the large use of cash. There are surely some other factors that determine the trade-off between cash and the use of banking services and products; a future analysis will deeply clarify this aspect.

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
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
Appendix A.

Evolution of the cash to GDP ratio



Source: Authors' calculation, based on the *Annual statistical bulletins* of the national central banks and IFS (IMF).

Evolution of the time deposits to GDP ratio



Source: Authors' calculation, based on the *Annual statistical bulletins* of the national central banks and IFS (IMF).

Appendix B. Data sources

Cash	currency outside banks (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
Demdep	demand deposits (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
demdepnat	overnight deposits in national currency, end-of-year
demdepfor	overnight deposits in foreign currency, end-of-year
demdephous	overnight deposits households, end-of-year
demdepbus	overnight deposits businesses, end-of-year
demdepins	overnight deposits of insurance companies, end-of-year
H	monetary base, end-of-year, Annual bulletins of the National banks
M1	monetary aggregate M1, end-of-year, Annual bulletins of central banks
M2	monetary aggregate M2, end-of-year, Annual bulletins of central banks
Timedep	quasi-money, end-of-year; or time deposits =M2-M1
timefordep	time deposits in foreign currency (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
tfdhouseh	time deposits in foreign currency of households(end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
tfdbusiness	time deposits in foreign currency of business (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
ddev	the share of time-deposits in foreign- currency in the total of time-deposits, own calculations populations savings as a part of the quasi-money, end-of-year (Romania).
savings	Observation: for Slovenia, in savings are government's time deposits at the national bank
timedepnat	time deposits in national currency (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
tdnhouseh	time deposits in national currency of households (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
tdnbusiness	time deposits in national currency of businesses (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
tdninscomp	time deposits in national currency of insurance companies (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks
Poprur	Rural population (% of total population): The data on urban population shares used to estimate rural population come from the United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. Total population figures are World Bank estimates. World Bank data
infl CPI, PPI	inflation rate, CPI and PPI (annual %, end-of-period), Estonia - BERD
Sscen	School enrollment, secondary (% gross): United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. World Bank data
Open	trade openness ((exports+ imports)/GDP), own calculations based on World Bank data
Chom	unemployment rate (% of labor force, end-of-year), Transition Report BERD. For most countries data reflect official employment records from the labor registries. In many countries, small enterprises are not recorded by official data. A number of countries have moved towards ILO-consistent labor force surveys in recording changes in labor force, employment and unemployment. Where available these data are presented.
Badloans	ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Non-performing loans include sub-standard, doubtful and loss classification categories for loans, but excludes loans transferred to a state rehabilitation agency or consolidation bank, end-of-year. Transition Report data - source: EBRD survey of central banks.
Forbk	the share of foreign-owned banks in the total number of banks, own calculations based on the Transition Report data
Exchrte	exchange rate (per US dollar), end-of-year - IFS, FMI
Volexch	standard deviation, in %, of the average nominal exchange rate related to US dollar, in the last 3 years.

Informel	Index of Economic Freedom, informal market grading scale 1 Very low - country has a free-market economy with informal market in such things as drugs and weapons 1.5 - 2 Low - country may have some informal market involvement in labor or pirating of intellectual property 2.5 - 3 Moderate - country may have some informal market activities in labor, agriculture and transportation and moderate levels of intellectual property rights High - country may have substantial levels of informal market activity in such areas as labor, pirated intellectual property and smuggled consumer goods, and in such services as transportation, electricity and telecommunications 3.5 - 4 4.5 - 5 Very high - country's informal market is larger than its formal economy
Bankref	EBRD index of banking sector reform (1-little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system; 2 - significant liberalisation of interest rate and credit allocation; 3-substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and regulation; 4-significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards)
Pricelib	EBRD index of price liberalization
Competpol	EBRD index of competition policy
Tradelib	EBRD index of forex and trade liberalization
Ssp	EBRD index of small-scale privatization
Lsp	EBRD index of large-scale privatization
Entrref	EBRD index of enterprise reform
Cd	Domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP- World Bank data
Irs	interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate): Interest rate spread is the interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. World Bank data
Gdpcap	GDP per capita (\$), Transition Report
Assets	asset share of state-owned banks (in per cent), transition report data
Govexp	general government expenditure, in % of GDP, BERD Transition Report data
Depositrate	IFS(FMI), rates offered to resident customers for demand, time, or saving deposits. Often, rates for time and saving deposits are classified according to maturity and amounts deposited. In addition, deposit money bank and similar deposit-taking institutions may offer short and medium-term instruments at specified rates for specific amounts and maturities; these are frequently termed "certificates of deposits". for countries where savings deposits are important, a Saving Rate (line 60k) is also published.
Lendingrate	IFS(FMI), the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium term financing needs of the private sector. This rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing.
M0/GDP	the ratio of cash to GDP
DD/GDP	the ratio of demand deposits to GDP
TD/GDP	the ratio of time deposits to GDP
GDP	IFS(FMI) the Gross Domestic Product, current, in national currency, end-of-year
M1/GDP	own calculations, the rapport between the monetary aggregate M1 and the GDP
DD/M1	the ratio of demand deposits to M1
DDFC/M1	the ratio of demand deposits in foreign currency to M1
DDFC/DD	the ratio of demand deposits in foreign currency in demand deposits

Population	population (thousands), ECB(Blue Book)
Cardcash	number of cards with a cash function, ECB (Blue Book)
Cardc	number of cards with a cash function per 1000 inhabitants, end of year, own calculation
ATMcash	number of ATMs with a card dispensing function, ECB (Blue Book)
ATMc	number of ATMS with a card dispensing function per 1000000 inhabitants, end of year, own calculation
Carddebit	number of cards with a debit function, ECB (Blue Book)
Cardd	number of cards with a debit function per 1000 inhabitants, end of year, own calculation
Terminals	number of terminals, ECB (Blue Book)
Termin	number of POS terminals per 1000000 inhabitants, end of year, own calculation
Cardcredit	number of cards with a credit function, ECB (Blue Book)
Cardcr	number of cards with a credit function per 1000 inhabitants, end of year, own calculation
Checks	cheques, ECB (Blue Book)
paycarddebit	payments by debit cards, ECB (Blue Book)
paycardcredit	payments by credit cards, ECB (Blue Book)
credittransfer	credit transfers, ECB (Blue Book)
Directdebit	direct debits, ECB (Blue Book)
Branches	number of branches of credit institutions , ECB (Blue book)

Appendix C

Table 1.1.1. The ratio of demand deposits to total deposits (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(1.1) GMM	(1.2) GMM	(1.3) GMM	(2.1) GMM	(2.2) GMM	(2.3) GMM
GDP per capita	-0.537 (6.16)***	-0.537 (6.13)***	-0.494 (5.83)***	-0.557 (5.52)***	-0.559 (5.46)***	-0.541 (5.28)***
Interest rate On time deposits	-0.272 (4.64)***	-0.280 (4.74)***	-0.246 (4.42)***			
Dummy euro area	0.831 (6.36)***	0.835 (6.29)***	0.814 (6.15)***	0.982 (6.36)***	0.982 (6.30)***	0.954 (6.10)***
Inflation				-0.186 (3.23)***	-0.196 (3.36)***	-0.207 (3.60)***
Constant	3.840 (4.85)***	3.838 (4.86)***	3.408 (4.50)***	3.863 (4.20)***	3.873 (4.17)***	3.745 (4.03)***
Anderson test (p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.2583	0.5834	0.2500	0.3923	0.2142	0.1367
Observations	133	129	129	134	130	130
R ²	0.8692	0.8712	0.8727	0.8429	0.8417	0.8424

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.

^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(1.1), (2.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(1.2), (2.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(1,3), (2,3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

Table.1.1.2. The ratio of demand deposits to total deposits (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.3)	(4.1)	(4.2)	(4.3)
GDP per capita	-0.589 (5.85)***	-0.582 (5.78)***	-0.554 (5.63)***	-0.580 (6.38)***	-0.564 (6.22)***	-0.540 (6.07)***
Government bonds Yield ¹	-0.306 (3.57)***	-0.320 (3.63)***	-0.281 (3.55)***	-0.083 (0.89)	-0.075 (0.86)	-0.035 (0.45)
Dummy euro area	1.066 (6.64)***	1.035 (6.43)***	1.013 (6.26)***	0.901 (6.36)***	0.889 (6.19)***	0.887 (6.17)***
Interest rate on time deposits				-0.270 (3.54)***	-0.277 (3.81)***	-0.265 (3.77)***
Constant	4.317 (4.76)***	4.282 (4.74)***	3.970 (4.60)***	4.316 (5.26)***	4.165 (5.12)***	3.856 (4.98)***
Anderson test (p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.0998	0.2189	0.2364	0.1025	0.2506	0.2451
Observations	93	91	91	93	91	91
R ²	0.8463	0.8469	0.8489	0.8618	0.8625	0.8622

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

¹ data missing in the case of Hungary

^{aa} the difference between the interest paid on government bonds and the interest paid on long-term deposits.

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.

^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(5.1), (6.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(5.2), (6.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(5.3), (6.3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

Table.1.1.3. The ratio of demand deposits to total deposits (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(5.1)	(5.2)	(5.3)	(6.1)	(6.2)	(6.3)
	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM
GDP per capita	-0.565 (4.54)***	-0.447 (3.70)***	-0.389 (3.36)***	-0.724 (5.94)***	-0.604 (5.30)***	-0.421 (4.14)***
Interest Differential ^{1,aa}	0.041 (0.44)	0.041 (0.53)	0.053 (0.74)			
Dummy euro area	1.196 (5.64)***	1.047 (4.85)***	0.950 (4.48)***	0.942 (5.82)***	0.912 (5.84)***	0.804 (5.19)***
Market capitalization (% GDP)				0.205 (3.30)***	0.135 (2.40)**	0.068 (1.38)
Constant	3.302 (3.32)***	2.281 (2.45)**	1.766 (2.05)**	4.361 (4.66)***	3.495 (4.00)***	2.128 (2.72)***
Anderson (p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.2256	0.0123	0.0140	0.6880	0.0364	0.0066
Observations	93	91	91	121	119	119
R ²	0.8004	0.8104	0.8160	0.8422	0.8570	0.8652

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

¹ data missing in the case of Hungary^{aa} the difference between the interest paid on government bonds and the interest paid on long-term deposits.^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(5.1), (6.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(5.2), (6.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(5.3), (6.3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

Table 2.1.1. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(7.1)	(7.2)	(7.3)	(8.1)	(8.2)	(8.3)
	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM
GDP per capita	-0.439 (7.34)***	-0.451 (7.40)***	-0.439 (7.66)***	-0.466 (7.18)***	-0.467 (7.02)***	-0.453 (7.09)***
Interest rate On time deposits	-0.054 (1.49)	-0.032 (0.89)	-0.022 (0.70)			
Dummy euro area	0.229 (1.84)*	0.278 (2.06)**	0.274 (2.04)**	0.238 (1.88)*	0.261 (1.91)*	0.253 (1.86)*
Inflation				-0.085 (2.41)**	-0.069 (1.95)*	-0.059 (1.79)*
Constant	2.981 (5.54)***	3.045 (5.56)***	2.917 (5.78)***	3.307 (5.60)***	3.279 (5.44)***	3.133 (5.47)***
Anderson test(p- value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p- value) ^b	0.2571	0.0211	0.0386	0.0662	0.0030	0.0058
Observations	136	132	132	137	133	133
R ²	0.8663	0.8625	0.8646	0.8643	0.8612	0.8636

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(7.1), (8.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(7.2), (8.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(7.3), (8.3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

Table 2.1.2. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(9.1) GMM	(9.2) GMM	(9.3) GMM	(10.1) GMM	(10.2) GMM	(10.3) GMM
GDP per capita	-0.316 (4.78)***	-0.310 (4.63)***	-0.303 (4.95)***	-0.322 (4.68)***	-0.292 (4.29)***	-0.293 (4.66)***
Interest rate	-0.040 (1.25)	-0.022 (0.71)	-0.021 (0.69)			
On time deposits						
Informal sector	0.182 (3.34)***	0.189 (3.51)***	0.189 (3.53)***	0.203 (3.67)***	0.218 (4.01)***	0.218 (4.04)***
Dummy euro area	0.388 (3.07)***	0.424 (3.10)***	0.419 (3.09)***	0.401 (3.26)***	0.409 (3.07)***	0.410 (3.09)***
Inflation				-0.074 (2.51)**	-0.064 (2.19)**	-0.065 (2.30)**
Constant	1.332 (1.89)*	1.220 (1.74)*	1.154 (1.76)*	1.408 (1.93)*	1.083 (1.51)	1.098 (1.64)
Anderson test(p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.7376	0.2207	0.3398	0.3545	0.0440	0.0874
Observations	136	132	132	137	133	133
R ²	0.8963	0.8950	0.8956	0.8995	0.8990	0.8989

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.

^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(9.1), (10.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(9.2), (10.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(9.3), (10.3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

Table 2.1.3. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(11.1) GMM	(11.2) GMM	(11.3) GMM	(12.1) GMM	(12.2) GMM	(12.3) GMM
GDP per capita	-0.322 (4.64)***	-0.337 (4.94)***	-0.317 (5.31)***	-0.503 (4.58)***	-0.383 (3.95)***	-0.384 (3.97)***
Informal sector	0.162 (2.76)***	0.165 (2.89)***	0.170 (3.02)***			
Dummy euro area	0.410 (3.22)***	0.445 (3.21)***	0.430 (3.17)***			
EBRD banking Reform index ¹				0.135 (1.19)	-0.026 (0.28)	-0.021 (0.23)
Constant	1.351 (1.88)*	1.476 (2.11)**	1.292 (2.05)**	2.980 (5.08)***	2.498 (4.65)***	2.501 (4.65)***
Anderson test(p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.6118	0.3325	0.4356	0.1830	0.0128	0.0281
Observations	137	133	133	130	127	127
R ²	0.8928	0.8893	0.8920	0.8379	0.8564	0.8561

Table 3.1.1. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(13.1)	(13.2)	(13.3)	(14.1)	(14.2)	(14.3)
	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM
GDP per capita	-0.432 (5.41)***	-0.382 (4.52)***	-0.371 (4.55)***	-0.452 (4.81)***	-0.430 (4.29)***	-0.423 (4.43)***
Inflation	-0.099 (3.34)***	-0.083 (2.71)***	-0.080 (2.66)***			
Interest rate	0.062	0.098	0.103	-0.038	-0.006	0.001
Spread	(0.99)	(1.35)	(1.45)	(0.50)	(0.07)	(0.01)
Dummy euro area	0.200 (1.51)	0.159 (1.09)	0.152 (1.04)	0.295 (1.92)*	0.271 (1.63)	0.266 (1.62)
Constant	2.919 (3.72)***	2.398 (2.89)***	2.283 (2.86)***	3.058 (3.33)***	2.817 (2.88)***	2.740 (2.97)***
Anderson test(p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.0911	0.0047	0.0098	0.2884	0.0235	0.0484
Observations	136	132	132	136	132	132
R ²	0.8738	0.8765	0.8778	0.8628	0.8649	0.8660

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.

^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(13.1), (14.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(13.2), (14.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(13.3), (14.3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)

Table 3.1.2. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) – IV/2SLS

Regressors	(15.1)	(15.2)	(15.3)	(16.1)	(16.2)	(16.3)
	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM	GMM
GDP per capita	-0.239 (5.92)***	-0.282 (7.72)***	-0.292 (8.62)***	-0.204 (3.67)***	-0.256 (4.53)***	-0.275 (5.01)***
Dollarisation	0.421 (9.74)***	0.431 (10.39)***	0.431 (10.39)***	0.422 (9.18)***	0.458 (10.26)***	0.458 (10.26)***
Dummy euro zone	-0.276 (2.38)**	-0.209 (1.77)*	-0.195 (1.67)*	-0.303 (2.53)**	-0.266 (2.14)**	-0.247 (2.01)**
Interest rate spread				0.048 (1.10)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.30)
Constant	1.695 (5.46)***	2.064 (7.30)***	2.145 (8.24)***	1.300 (2.44)**	1.881 (3.42)***	2.067 (3.85)***
Anderson test(p-value) ^a	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Hansen J (p-value) ^b	0.0074	0.0279	0.0469	0.0077	0.0132	0.0134
Observations	135	131	131	134	130	130
R ²	0.9456	0.9462	0.9455	0.9455	0.9474	0.9471

Robust t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^a the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified.

^b the instruments are the valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.

Instrumented: real GDP per capita.

Excluded instruments:

(15.1), (16.1): the simple set (initial GDP per capita, initial level of educational attainment)

(15.2), (16.2): the policy set (the simple set + government size, openness to international trade)

(15.3), (16.3): the full set (the policy set + political stability)